Abstract. Byzantine Agreement (BA) among n players allows the players to agree on a value, even when up to t of the players are faulty. In the broadcast variant of BA, one dedicated player holds a message, and all players shall learn this message. In the consensus variant of BA, every player holds (presumably the same) message, and the players shall agree on this message. BA is the probably most important primitive in distributed protocols, hence its efficiency is of particular importance. BA from scratch, i.e., without a trusted setup, is possible only for t < n/3. In this setting, the known BA protocols are highly efficient (O(n 2 ) bits of communication) and provide information-theoretic security. When a trusted setup is available, then BA is possible for t < n/2 (consensus), respectively for t < n (broadcast). In this setting, only computationally secure BA protocols are reasonably efficient (O(n 3 κ) bits). When information-theoretic security is required, the most efficient known BA protocols require O(n 17 κ) bits of communication per BA, where κ denotes a security parameter. The main reason for this huge communication is that in the information-theoretic world, parts of the setup are consumed with every invocation to BA, and hence the setup must be refreshed. This refresh operation is highly complex and communicationintensive. In this paper we present BA protocols (both broadcast and consensus) with information-theoretic security for t < n/2, communicating O(n 5 κ) bits per BA.
Introduction

Byzantine Agreement, Consensus, and Broadcast
The problem of Byzantine agreement (BA), as originally proposed by Pease, Shostak, and Lamport [PSL80] , is the following: n players P 1 , . . . , P n want to reach agreement on some message m, but up to t of them are faulty and try to prevent the others from reaching agreement. There are two flavors of the BA problem: In the broadcast problem, a designated player (the sender) holds an input message m, and all players should learn m and agree on it. In the consensus problem, every player P i holds (supposedly the same) message m i , and the players want to agree on this message.
More formally, a protocol with P S giving input m is a broadcast protocol, when every honest P i outputs the same message m i = m for some m (consistency), and when m = m, given that P S is honest (validity). Analogously, a protocol with every player P i giving input m i is a consensus protocol, when every honest P i outputs m i = m for some m (consistency), and when m = m, given that every honest P i inputs the same message m i = m for some m (validity).
Models and Bounds
We assume that the players are connected with a complete synchronous network of secure channels. Complete means that each pair of players shares a channel. Synchronous means that all players share a common clock and that the message delay in the network is bounded by a constant.
The feasibility of broadcast and consensus depends on whether or not a trusted setup (e.g. a PKI setup) is available. When no trusted setup is available ("from scratch"), then consensus and broadcast are achievable if and only if at most t < n/3 players are corrupted. When a trusted setup is available, then consensus is achievable if and only if at most t < n/2 players are corrupted, and broadcast is achievable if and only if at most t < n players are corrupted. All bounds can be achieved with information-theoretical security, and the bounds are tight even with respect to cryptographic security. We stress in particular that no broadcast protocol (even with cryptographic intractability assumptions) can exceed the t < n/3 bound unless it can rely on a trusted setup [FLM86, Fit03] . The main difference between protocols with information-theoretic security and those with cryptographic security is their efficiency.
Efficiency of Byzantine Agreement
We are interested in the communication complexity of BA protocols. The bit complexity of a protocol is defined as the number of bits transmitted by all honest players during the whole protocol, overall.
In the model without trusted setup, Byzantine agreement among n players is achievable for t < n/3 communicating O(n 2 ) bits [BGP92, CW92] . In the model with a trusted setup, the communication complexity of BA heavily depends on whether information-theoretic security is required or cryptographic security is sufficient. When cryptographic security is sufficient, then O(n 3 κ) bits are sufficient for reaching agreement, where κ denotes the security parameter [DS83] . When information-theoretic security is desired, then reaching agreement requires at least O(n 6 κ) bits of communication [BPW91, PW96, Fit03] . However, the latter result consumes the setup, i.e., a given setup can be used only for one single BA operation. Of course, one can start with a m times larger setup which supports m BA operations, but the number of BA operations is a priori fixed, and the size of the setup grows linearly with the number of intended BA operations. This diametrically contrasts the cryptographic scenario, where a fixed-size setup is sufficient for polynomially many BA operations. In [PW96] , a method for refreshing the setup is shown: They start with a compact setup, use some part of the setup to perform the effective BA operation, and the remaining setup to generate a new, full-fledged setup. With this approach, a constant-size setup is sufficient for polynomially many BA invocations. However, with every BA invocation, the setup must be refreshed, which requires a communication of O(n 17 κ) bits [PW96, Fit03] . Hence, when the initial setup should be compact, then the costs for a BA operation of [PW96] is as high as O(n 17 κ) bits.
Contributions
We present a protocol for information-theoretically secure Byzantine agreement (both consensus and broadcast) which communicates O(n 4 κ) bits when the setup may be consumed (i.e., the number of BA operations per setup is a priori fixed). This contrasts to the communication complexity of O(n 6 κ) bits of previous information-theoretically secure BA protocols [BPW91, PW96] .
More importantly, we present a refresh operation for our BA protocol, communicating only O(n 5 κ) bits, contrasting the complexity of O(n 17 κ) bits of previous refresh protocols [PW96] . This new results allows for polynomially many information-theoretically secure BA operations from a fixed-size setup, where each BA operations costs O(n 5 κ) bits. This substantial speed-up is primarily due to a new concept, namely that the refresh operation does not need to succeed all the time. Whenever the setup is to be refreshed, the players try to do so, but if they fail, they pick a fresh setup from an a priori prepared stock. Furthermore, using techniques from the playerelimination framework [HMP00] , the number of failed refresh operations can be limited to t. Using algebraic information-theoretic pseudo-signatures [SHZI02] for appropriate parameters, the function to be computed in the refresh protocol becomes algebraic, more precisely a circuit over a finite field with multiplicative depth 1. Such a function is very well suited for efficient non-robust computation; in fact, it can be computed based on a simple one-dimensional Shamir-sharing, although t < n/2.
1 This allows a very simple refresh protocol with low communication overhead.
Compared to the refresh protocol of [PW96] , our refresh protocol has the disadvantage that it requires t < n/2, whereas the protocol of [PW96] can cope with t < n. However, almost all applications using BA as sub-protocol (like voting, biding, multi-party computation, etc.) inherently require t < n/2, hence the limitation on our BA protocol is usually of theoretical relevance only.
Preliminaries
Formal Model
We consider a set of n players P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, communicating over pairwise secure synchronous channels. Many constructions require a finite field F; we set this field to F = GF (2 κ ) where κ is a security parameter (we allow a negligible error probability of O(2 −κ )). To every player P i ∈ P, a unique non-zero element α i ∈ F \ {0} is assigned. The faultiness of players is modeled by a central computationally unlimited adversary adaptively corrupting up to t < n/2 players and taking full control over them.
We assume that there is a trusted setup, i.e., before the protocol starts, a fixed probabilistic function Init : 1 κ → (state 1 , . . . , state n ) is run by a trusted party, and every player P i ∈ P secretly receives state i as his initial state.
Information-Theoretically Secure Signatures
A classical (cryptographic) signature scheme consists of three algorithms: KeyGen, Sign, and Verify. KeyGen generates two keys, a signing key for the signer and a public verification key; Sign computes a signature for a given message and a given signing key; and Verify checks whether a signature matches a message for a given verification key. A secure signature scheme must satisfy that every signature created by Sign is accepted by Verify (with the corresponding signing/verification keys, completeness), and without the signing key it is infeasible to compute a signature which is accepted by Verify (unforgeability). Classical signature schemes provide cryptographic security only, i.e., an unbounded forger can always find an accepting signature for any given message, with exhaustive search, using Verify as test predicate.
As an information-theoretically secure signature scheme must be secure even with respect to a computationally unbounded adversary, every verifier must have a different verification key, and these verification keys must be kept private. Thus it cannot be automatically guaranteed that a signature is either valid for all verifiers or for no verifier (it might be valid for one verifier, but invalid for another one). Therefore, an additional property called transferability is required: It is impossible for a faulty signer to produce a signature which, with non-negligible probability, is valid for some honest verifier without being valid for some other honest verifier. We say that a signature scheme is information-theoretically secure if it is complete, unforgeable and transferable.
In [SHZI02] , a so called (ψ, ψ )-secure signature scheme is presented, which allows the signer to sign a message m ∈ F such that any of the players in P can verify the validity of the signature. As long as the signer signs at most ψ messages and each verifier verifies at most ψ signatures the success probability of attacks is less then 1/|F| = 2 −κ . Here, we use a one-time signature scheme (i.e., one setup allows only for one single signature), where every verifier may verify up to t + 2 signatures (of the same signer). In context of [SHZI02] , this means that we set ψ = 1 and ψ = t+2.
By simplifying the notation (and by assuming that 2t + 1 ≤ n), we receive the following scheme:
KeyGen: Key generation takes as input the string 1 κ , and outputs the signing key sk to the signer P S and the n verification keys vk 1 , . . . , vk n to the respective verifiers P 1 , . . . , P n . The signing key is a random vector sk = (p 0 , . . . , p n+1 , q 0 , . . . , q n+1 ) ∈ F 2(n+2) , defining the polynomial
The verification key vk i of each player P i ∈ P is the vector
where the values v i,1 , . . . , v i,n+1 are chosen uniformly at random from F, and the x i -and y i -values characterize the polynomial F sk , when applied to
The signature σ of a message m ∈ F is a vector σ = (σ 0 , . . . , σ n+1 ), characterizing the polynomial F sk when applied to m, i.e., σ j = p j + mq j for j = 0, . . . , n + 1. Verify: Given a message m, a signature σ = (σ 0 , . . . , σ n+1 ), and the verification key vk i = (v i,1 , . . . , v i,n+1 , x i , y i ) of player P i , the verification algorithm checks whether
The protocol has the following sizes: Signing key: (2n + 4)κ bits; verification key: (n + 3)κ bits; signature: (n + 2)κ bits. The total information distributed for one signature scheme (called sig-setup) consists of (n 2 + 5n + 8)κ bits. Note that a sig-setup for the player set P is trivially also a valid sig-setup for every player subset P ⊆ P. We will need this observation later.
Protocol Overview
Basically, the new broadcast protocol is the protocol of [DS83] , ameliorated with information-theoretically secure signatures [SHZI02] . Similarly to [PW96] , we start with a compact (constant-size) setup, which allows only for few broadcasts, and use some of these broadcasts for broadcasting the payload, and some of them to refresh the remaining setup, resulting in a fresh, full-fledged setup.
We borrow ideas from the player-elimination framework [HMP00] to substantially speed-up the refresh protocol: The generation of the new setup is performed non-robustly, i.e., it may fail when an adversary is present, but then the failure is detected by (at least) one honest player. At the end of the refresh protocol, the players jointly decide (using one BA-Operation) whether the refresh has succeeded or not; if yes, they are happy to have generated a new setup. If it failed, they run a fault-handling procedure, which yields a set E of two players, (at least) one of them faulty. As originally the set P contains an honest majority, also the set P \ E contains an honest majority. So the player set is reduced to P ← P \ E (with at most t ← t − 1 faulty players).
We are still missing the fresh setup; however, as with each fault-handling, one faulty player is eliminated from the actual player set, faults can occur only t times. For these t cases, we have a stock of t prepared setups, and with each fault, we take one out of this stock. This way it is ensured that at any point in the protocol, we have t prepared setups on stock, where t is the maximum number of faulty players in P . More precisely, the protocol runs as follows:
Initial Setup: The procedure Init generates 2 + 5t BA-setups 2 ; one for the first BA operation, one for the first invocation of the refresh protocol, and t extra setups for the stock, each consisting of 2 BA-setups for replacing the failed refresh and 3 BA-setups for localizing the set E ⊆ P in the fault-handling procedure. The actual player set is set to P = P and the maximum number of faulty players in P to t = t. Broadcast/Consensus: To perform a BA operation, the protocol Broadcast, resp. Consensus is invoked with the payload. In parallel, Refresh is invoked to refresh the reduced setup. If successful, Refresh produces two BA-setups using only one single BA operation. If Refresh fails, 5 BA-setups are taken from the stock, an elimination set E ⊆ P is localized (using 3 BA's) and eliminated (P ← P \ E, t ← t − 1), and the two remaining BA-setups are kept as new state -for the next Broadcast/Consensus operation.
In our presentation, we ignore the fact that faulty players can sent no message (or a message in a wrong format) when they are expected to send a message to an honest player. As general rule, we assume that when an honest player does not receive an expected message, he behaves as if he had received the zero-message.
Broadcast and Consensus
We present the protocols for the actual broadcast and consensus operation.
Note that the Refresh protocol outputs correct BA setup for P only (rather than P). However, as P \ P might contain honest players we need to achieve BA in P. We first present the BA protocols for P , then show how to realize BA in P using these protocols.
As [SHZI02] signatures can cope only with message in the field F, also our BA protocols are limited to messages m ∈ F. An extension to longer messages is sketched in Appendix A.
We first present a broadcast protocol that allows a sender P S ∈ P to consistently distribute a message m ∈ F to the players in P .
3 The protocol is essentially the protocol of [DS83] , with a simplified description of [Fit03] . In addition, the protocol is modified such that in one protocol run every player verifies at most ψ = t+2 signatures of each signer (as required by our signature scheme).
Every player maintains a set A of accepted messages, a set N of newly accepted messages, and (one or several) sets Σ m of received signatures for a message m.
Protocol Broadcast'.
0. Sender P S : Send m and the corresponding signature σ S to all P i ∈ P . 1. ∀P i ∈ P : If P i received from the sender a message m together with a valid signature σ S set A = N = {m} and Σ m = {σ S }. k. In each Step k = 2, . . . , t + 1, execute the following sub-steps for every player P i ∈ P \ {P S }: k.1 For every message m ∈ N , compute the signature σ i on m, and send (m, Σ m ∪ {σ i }) to all players in P . Set N = {}. k.2 In turn, for every message (m, Σ m ) received in Sub-step k.1 do:
-If m ∈ A, or if |A| ≥ 2, ignore the message, -else if Σ m contains valid signatures from at least k different players in P , including P S , include m in A and in N , -else ignore the received message (m, Σ m ) and all further messages from the player who has sent it. t +2. ∀P i : if |A| = 1, then accept m ∈ A as the broadcasted value. Otherwise, the sender is faulty, and accept m =⊥ (or any fixed pre-agreed value from F) as the broadcasted value.
One can easily verify that the protocol Broadcast' is as secure as the used signature scheme [DS83, Fit03] and that every player verifies at most t + 2 signatures from the same signer. Furthermore, every signer P i issues up to two signatures; however, the second one is for the sole goal of proving to other players that the sender P S is faulty, and the secrecy of P i 's signing key is not required anymore. Hence, it is sufficient to use a one-time signature scheme, whose unforgeability property is broken once the signer issues two signatures.
To construct a consensus protocol in P , we use a trick of [Fit04] : Every player needs two sig-setups, a primary scheme for the same purpose as in the above protocol, and an alternative scheme for identifying the message (if there is any) originally held by the majority of the players. During the protocol execution, every player P i additionally maintains (one or several) sets Σ m , containing alternative signatures σ j (issued by P j ) for m, where Σ m with |Σ m | ≥ n − t now "replaces" the sender's signature in the above broadcast protocol. Now we present the consensus protocol for P , each P i holding a message m i ∈ F:
0. ∀P i ∈ P : Send m i and the corresponding (alternative) signature σ i to all players in P . 1. ∀P i ∈ P : If there exists a message m received (together with a valid signature) from at least n − t different players, let Σ m denote the set of all these signatures, and set A = N = {m} and Σ m = {}. If no such message exists, set A = N = {}. k. In each Step k = 2, . . . , t + 2, execute the following sub-steps for every player P i ∈ P : k.1 For every message m ∈ N , compute the signature σ i on m, and send (m, Σ m , Σ m ∪ {σ i }) to all players in P . Set N = {}. k.2 In turn, for every message (m, Σ m , Σ m ) received in Sub-step k.1 do:
-If m ∈ A, or if |A| ≥ 2, ignore the message, -else if Σ m contains valid signatures in the primary scheme from at least k − 1 different players in P , and Σ m contains valid signatures in the alternative scheme from at least n −t different players in P , then include m in A and in N , -else ignore the received message (m, Σ m , Σ m ) and all further messages from the player who has sent it. t +3. ∀P i : if |A| = 1, accept m ∈ A as the agreed value, otherwise (there was no pre-agreement) accept m =⊥.
The security of the protocol Consensus' follows immediately from the security of the protocol Broadcast', and the fact that every player issues at most one signature in the alternative scheme, and each such signature is verified at most t + 1 times. The communication complexity of BA in P is at most 4n 3 |σ| + 3n 2 κ + n 2 |σ| = (8n 4 + 26n 3 + 9n 2 )κ. Broadcast and consensus in P can be constructed from consensus in P :
Protocol Broadcast. 1. The sender P S ∈ P sends the message m to every player P j ∈ P . 2. Invoke Consensus' to reach agreement on m among P . 3. Every player P i ∈ P sends the agreed message m to every player P j ∈ P. 4. Every player P j ∈ P accepts the message m which was received most often.
Protocol Consensus. 1. Invoke Consensus' to reach agreement on m among P . 2. Every player P i ∈ P sends the agreed message m to every player P j ∈ P. 3. Every player P j ∈ P accepts the message m which was received most often.
The security of these protocols follows from the security of Consensus' and from t < n /2 and t < n/2. The communication complexity of BA in P is at most (8n 4 + 26n 3 + 11n 2 )κ.
Refreshing the Setup
Overview
To "refresh" the setup means to compute a new setup which allows for two BA operations, while this computation consumes only one BA-setup. The protocol Refresh generates the new setup with a special-purpose MPC among the players in P . This computation is performed non-robustly: Every sub-protocol either achieves its intended goal, or it fails. When it fails, then at least one honest player detects the failure. We do not require agreement on the fact whether or not a sub-protocol has failed. Only at the very end of Refresh, the players agree on whether or not a player has detected a failure during the computation (using consensus, thereby consuming one BA-setup). The computation takes only random values as input, so in case of failure, privacy is of no interest. The computation of the verification keys will not only be non-robust, but even non-detectable, i.e., it might output wrong values without any (honest) player detecting the failure. However, once the verification keys are generated, their correctness is verified, and honest players can detect whether or not there was a failure.
We provide a fault-handling sub-protocol, to be invoked when Refresh fails, which localizes a set E ⊆ P of two players, where (at least) one of them is faulty. This allows to reduce the actual player set, thereby reducing the maximum number of faulty players, thereby limiting the number of times Refresh can fail. In this fault-handling sub-protocol, every players sends to some designated player all messages he has received during the course of the protocol, as well as all random elements he sampled (which define the sent messages). Given this information, the designated player can help to compute the set E to eliminate.
In the sequel, we present the used sub-protocols (all of them non-robust), and finally the protocols Refresh and FaultHandling. The protocol Refresh invokes once the protocol Consensus', hence it consumes one valid BA-setup. The protocol FaultHandling invokes 3 times the protocol Broadcast; it requires enough BAsetups for that. However, the protocol FaultHandling is invoked only t times in total, so the required BA-setups can be prepared at beforehand.
For the sake of a simpler presentation, we give to every player P i a flag fail i , which is initialized to false, and is set to true once P i has detected a failure. We say that a protocol succeeds when no player has detected a failure; otherwise, the protocol fails.
Secret Sharing
We use standard Shamir sharing [Sha79] . We say that a value a is t -shared among the players P if there exists a degree-t polynomial f (·) with f (0) = a, and every (honest) player P i ∈ P holds a share a i = f (α i ), where α i is the unique evaluation point assigned to P i . We denote the collection of shares as a . Observe that we can easily add up shared values, namely a + b = ( a 1 + b 1 , . . . , a n + b n ). We write a + b as a short hand.
In order to let a dealer P D ∈ P verifiably share a value a according to Shamir sharing, we employ the following (non-robust) protocol (based on the VSS protocol of [BGW88]) Protocol Share. 1. (Distribution.) P D selects the coefficients c 0,1 , c 1,0 , . . . , c t ,t at random, and sets f (x, y) = a + c 1,0 x + c 0,1 y + c 1,1 xy + . . . + c t ,t x t y t . Then, to every P i ∈ P , P D computes and sends the polynomials f i, (y) = f (α i , y) and
2. (Checking.) For every pair P i , P j ∈ P , P i sends f i, (α j ) to P j , who compares the received value with f ,j (α i ). P j sets fail j = true if some difference is non-zero. 3. (Output) Every P j outputs a i = f i, (0). Lemma 1. The protocol Share has the following properties: (Completeness) If all players in P correctly follow the protocol, then the protocol succeeds. (Correctness) If the protocol succeeds, then the outputs ( a 1 , . . . , a n ) define a degree-t polynomial f (·). (Validity & Privacy) If the protocol succeeds and the dealer is honest with input a, then f (0) = a and no subset of t players obtains any information on a. (Complexity) The protocol communicates at most (2n 2 − 2n)κ bits and requires at most (
The following protocol lets the players in P reconstruct a correctly Shamir shared value a towards a designated player P R ∈ P :
Protocol Recons. 1. Every player P i ∈ P sends his share a i to the recipient P R . 2. P R verifies whether a 1 , . . . , a n lie on a degree-t polynomial f (·) and outputs a = f (0) if yes. Otherwise, P R sets fail R = true and outputs a = 0.
Lemma 2. The protocol Recons has the following properties: (Completeness) If all players in P correctly follow the protocol, then the protocol succeeds. (Correctness) If the protocol succeeds, then P R outputs the correct secret a. (Complexity) The protocol communicates at most (n − 1)κ bits and requires no randomness.
Generating Random Values
We present a (trivial) protocol that allows the players to generate a random value c ∈ R F, known to all players in P .
Protocol GenerateRandom. 1. ∀P i ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P t +1 }: select a random value c i ∈ R F and invoke Share to share c i among P .
3. ∀P k ∈ P : invoke Recons to reconstruct c towards player P k .
Lemma 3. The protocol GenerateRandom has the following properties: (Completeness) If all players in P correctly follow the protocol, then the protocol succeeds. (Correctness) If the protocol succeeds, then it generates a uniformly random value c ∈ R F, known to all players P j ∈ P . (Complexity)
The protocol communicates at most (n 3 + n 2 − 2n)κ bits and requires at most (
Proof (sketch). Completeness and complexity follow from inspecting the protocol. We now focus on the case when the protocol succeeds. There is at least one honest player P h in {P 1 , . . . , P t +1 }, who chooses his value c h uniformly at random. As in Step 1, the adversary does not obtain any information about c h (privacy of Share), and as the values c i of every player P i ∈ P are fixed after
Step 1 (Correctness of Share), c h is statistically independent of all other values c j (j = i). Hence, the sum c 1 + . . . + c t +1 is uniformly distributed.
Generating one Sig-setup
Recall that a sig-setup for a designated signer P S consists of the signing key (p 0 , . . . , p n +1 , q 0 , . . . , q n +1 ), which should be random and known only to the signer P S , and one verification key (v i,1 , . . . , v i,n +1 , x i , y i ) for each player P i ∈ P , where the values v i,1 , . . . , v i,n +1 should be random and known only to P i ,
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and the values x i and y i are computed as Protocol Refresh. 0. ∀P i ∈ P : set fail i = false. 1. Invoke GenerateSignatureSetup 4n times in parallel to generate 4 sig-setups for each signer P S ∈ P . 2. ∀P i ∈ P : Send fail i to every P j ∈ P . 3. ∀P j ∈ P : Set fail j = true if any received bits fail i = true. 4. Invoke Consensus' with P j 's input being fail j . Denote the output as fail. 5. ∀P i ∈ P : send fail to every P j ∈ (P \ P ). 6. ∀P j ∈ (P \ P ): Set fail as the majority of the received bits.
It is easy to see that Refresh fails when any GenerateSignatureSetup failed for an honest player. On the other hand, when all players follow the protocol, then Refresh succeeds. Refresh communicates O(n 5 )κ bits.
Fault Handling
The following fault-handling procedure is invoked only when Refresh has failed (i.e., the players agree on fail = true). The goal of FaultHandling is to localize a set E ∈ P of two players, such that (at least) one of them is faulty.
FaultHandling exploits the fact that there is no need to maintain the secrecy of the failed Refresh protocol. Basically, in FaultHandling the whole transcript of Refresh is revealed and there will be a message from some player P i to some player P j , where P i claims to have sent some other message than P j claims to have received -hence either P i or P j is lying, and we can set E = {P i , P j }. Unfortunately, it would be too expensive to publicly reveal the whole transcript; instead, the transcript is revealed towards a selected player (e.g. P k ∈ P with the smallest index k), who searches for the fault and announces it.
We stress that the considered transcript not only contains the messages of all invocations of the protocol GenerateSignatureSetup, but also the messages of the protocol Refresh. This is important because it might be that no fault occurred in GenerateSignatureSetup, but still some (corrupted) player P i claimed to have fail i = true.
Protocol FaultHandling. 1. Every P i ∈ P sends to P k all random values chosen during the course of the protocol Refresh (including all sub-protocols), as well as all values received during the course of Refresh. 2. P k computes for every P i the messages P i should have sent (when being correct) during the course of Refresh; this can be done based on the random values and the received messages of P i . 3. P k searches for a message from some player P i ∈ P to some other player P j ∈ P , where P i should have sent a message x i (according to his claimed randomness), but P j claims to have received x j , where x i = x j . Denote the index of this message by . 4. P k invokes Broadcast to announce (i, j, , x i , x j ).
5. P i invokes Broadcast to announce whether he indeed sent x i in the -th message. 6. P j invokes Broadcast to announce whether he indeed received x j in the -th message. 7. If Both P i and P j confirm to have sent x i , respectively to have received x j , then E = {P i , P j }. If P i does not confirm to have sent x i , then E = {P k , P i }. If P j does not confirm to have received x j , then E = {P k , P j }.
FaultHandling requires 3 BA invocations and communicates O(n 5 κ) bits.
Conclusions
We have presented a BA protocol for n players that achieves informationtheoretic security against t < n/2 faulty players, communicating O(n 5 κ) bits (for some security parameter κ). The protocol requires a compact constant-size setup, as all BA protocols that tolerate t ≥ n/3 do (also those with cryptographic security only), and allows for polynomially many BA operations.
This result improves on the existential result of [PW96] , which communicates O(n 17 κ) bits per BA.
A Long Messages
The proposed BA protocols only capture messages m ∈ F, i.e., κ-bit messages.
In order to reach BA on longer messages, one could invoke the according BA protocol several times (once for every κ bit block). However, this would blow up the communication complexity unnecessarily high: BA of a κ bit message would require a communication complexity of O( n 5 κ) bits (as opposed to O( κn 2 + n 17 κ) in [PW96] ). In this section, we sketch a construction that allows BA of a κ bit message at costs of O( κn 2 + n 5 κ) bits. In order to achieve the stated complexity, we need to replace the protocol Consensus' by Consensus long '. The basic idea of Consensus long ' is straight forward: Every player P i ∈ P sends his message m i to every other player. Then, the players use Consensus' to reach agreement on a universal hash value. If agreement is achieved, all players output the message with the agreed hash value, otherwise they output ⊥. The key for the universal hash function is assumed to be preshared among the players as part of the BA-setup, and only reconstructed when needed. We also explain how this sharing is prepared in the Refresh protocol.
A.1 Protocol Consensus long '
In the following, we present the protocol Consensus long among the players in P , reaching agreement on a κ bit message m. The protocol makes use of universal hashing [CW79] . As universal hash with key k ∈ F, we use the function U k : F → F, (m (1) , . . . , m ( ) ) → m (1) + m (2) k + . . . + m ( ) k −1 . The probability that two different messages map to the same hash value for a uniformly chosen key is at most /|F|, which is negligible in our setting with F = GF (2 κ ).
Protocol Consensus long '. 1. Every P i ∈ P sends his message m i to every player P j ∈ P . 2. The players reconstruct the random hash key k ∈ F, which is part of the BA setup.
3. Every P i ∈ P computes (for his original message m i ) the universal hash U k (m i ). 4. The players in P invoke Consensus' to reach agreement on the hash value h. 5. If the above consensus fails (i.e., h =⊥), then every P i ∈ P outputs ⊥. If it succeeds, then every P i ∈ P outputs that m j received in Step 1 with U k (m j ) = h.
One can easily see that the above protocol reaches consensus on m, and that it communicates O( κn 2 ) plus one invocations of Consensus', i.e., communicates O( κn 2 + n 4 κ) overall.
A.2 Generating the Hash Key
The protocol Consensus long ' needs a random hash key to be known to all players in P . We cannot afford to generate this hash key on-line (this would require several invocations of broadcast). Instead, we assume a robust sharing of a random field element to be part of every BA-setup. This sharing is then reconstructed when needed.
As robust sharing, we use the scheme of [CDD + 99] . Essentially, this is a twodimensional Shamir sharing, ameliorated with so called authentication tags. The sharing is constructed non-robustly; in the Share protocol, the players pairwisely check the consistency of the received shares, and fail in presence of faults. The sharing of the hash key is generated as sum of a sharing of each player in P . Such a sharing can be computed with communicating O(n 4 κ) bits (and without involving broadcast). When the hash key is needed, then the sharing of the actual BA setup is reconstructed towards every player in P . This is achieved by having every player sending his shares (including the authentication tags) to every other player; this involves a communication of O(n 3 κ) bits.
7 In order to do so, the message mi is split into blocks m 
